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THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: AFTER THE
FEDERAL COURTS’ ABDICATION, WILL STATE COURTS FILL IN THE
BREACH?
By Asa Markel*
I.

INTRODUCTION
Twice in the past two years the United States Supreme Court has confronted two

issues concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations1 (“VCCR”): compliance
of state law enforcement officials with the VCCR and the tension between state criminal
procedural rules and the VCCR. At least four cases heard by the Court since 1998 have
involved alleged violations of the VCCR by state officials; two of which involved claims
brought by foreign governments. Additionally, all four cases of alleged violations found
their way into three separate suits by three different foreign governments against the
United States in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). One of the first American
appellate decisions on the subject expressed “disenchantment” with state officials’
conduct in violating the VCCR, observing that “[t]here are disturbing implications in that
conduct for larger interests of the United States and its citizens.”2 However, the Supreme
Court’s latest decision, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,3 does very little to counter these
disturbing implications.
In light of the Court’s most recent decision on the subject, this article seeks to
summarize the current domestic legal status and availability of the right of a foreign
national under international law, as embodied in Article 36 of the VCCR, to be advised

* Attorney and solicitor with the law firm of Shorall McGoldrick Brinkmann (J.D., University of Arizona).
1
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 14 (Cmnd. 5219), J.O. Apr. 18,
1971, 1971 Recueil des traités, No. 34 (Fr.) [hereinafter VCCR].
2
Rep. of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998).
3
126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
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upon arrest in the United States by local law enforcement officials of his or her right to
have access to consular assistance and advice. As will be seen, the problem in the United
States appears largely confined to state law enforcement compliance with the VCCR,
rather than compliance by federal law enforcement officials. Thus, the wider legal and
political issue for American jurists to consider is the effect on the federal government’s
foreign relations due to state governments’ recurring failure to give effect to the rights
established under the VCCR. Moreover, the present impasse on the issue of Article 36
compliance appears to originate from the restrictions imposed on the federal courts’
ability to review alleged violations by state law enforcement officials and concomitant
defects in state criminal proceedings. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Sanchez-Llamas appears to read the VCCR to exonerate such a state of affairs.
Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned that these domestic legal developments (or
lack thereof) will have more far-reaching effects for Americans living and working
abroad, as well as foreigners arrested by state law enforcement officials in this country.

II.

THE CONSULAR NOTIFICATION RIGHT AND STATE COMPLIANCE
The VCCR, along with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations7 and the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally

7

Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 1965 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 19 (Cmnd. 2565), J.O. Apr. 17,
1971, 1971 Recueil des traités, No. 32 (Fr.) [hereinafter VCDR].

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 2

Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (“CPPC”),8 forms the core of
international law concerning diplomatic and consular rights and obligations between
nation states.9 The United States and 169 other nations have signed and ratified the
VCCR.10 Article 36 of the VCCR provides three essential rights with respect to consular
access: the right of consular officials to have “access to” and “to communicate” with their
nationals within the host state;11 the right of consular officials to have access to their
nationals in “prison, custody, or detention” in the host state;12 and the right of foreign
nationals who have been arrested in the host state to be informed of their rights to
consular access “without delay.”13 Indeed, some bilateral consular treaties require the
host state to inform the foreign state’s consular officials of the arrest of one of its
nationals.14 The importance of this right of consular notification to national governments
is emphasized by its acknowledgment not only in the VCCR15 and the mandatory
notification provisions of bilateral consular treaties, but also in the CPPC.16

8

Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 3 (Cmnd. 7765), J.O., Oct. 16,
2003, p. 17597 (Fr.) [hereinafter CPPC]. The federal government has specifically codified offenses against
foreign officials and other internationally protected persons under domestic criminal law. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116 (2006).
9
This presumption is evident from the United States Code, where no specific enabling provision
domesticates the VCCR. However, Congress has determined to allow foreign missions within the United
States to enjoy the privileges and immunities of the VCDR even if they are not parties to that treaty,
evidencing that treaty’s status as the yardstick for diplomatic law. See 22 U.S.C. § 254b (2006).
10
Sanchez-Llama v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006).
11
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(a).
12
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(c).
13
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b).
14
See, e.g., Consular Convention, U.S.-U.K., art.16, June 6, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3426, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
37 (Cmnd. 524); Consular Convention, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 12, June 1, 1964, 19 U.S.T. 5018.
15
Consular representation is of such importance that the Member States of the European Union and
Commonwealth of Nations have specifically undertaken to provide reciprocal consular representation for
nationals of other member states wherever a European or Commonwealth citizen’s own government does
not have adequate consular facilities. See Council Decision 95/553, 1995 O.J. (L 314) 73 (EC);
MARGARET P. DOXEY, THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT AND THE CONTEMPORARY COMMONWEALTH
104 (St. Martins Press 1989) (discussing Ottawa Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
(CHOGM) of 1973). Countries within the Commonwealth have also agreed that where a Commonwealth
citizen’s government has no adequate consular representation, the host government will provide consular
services. Id. Indeed, the United States has expressed a clear interest in the rights of its citizens imprisoned
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The importance of consular access for American citizens traveling abroad has
been acknowledged again and again by both judicial and political commentators. In his
dissenting opinion in Sanchez-Llamas Justice Breyer noted that the object of the Article
36 “is to assure consular communication and assistance to such nationals, who may not
fully understand the host country’s legal regime or even speak its language.”17 Justice
Breyer then, quoting from State Department materials, stated, “one of the basic functions
of a consular office has been to provide a ‘cultural bridge’ between the host community
and the [U.S. national]. No one needs that cultural bridge more than the individual U.S.
citizen who has been arrested in a foreign country or imprisoned in a foreign jail.”18 The
State Department has specifically stated:
The right of governments, through their consular officials, to be informed
promptly of the detention of their nationals in foreign states, and to be
allowed prompt access to those nationals, is well established in the
practice of civilized nations . . . . Detained foreign nationals are inevitably
distressed by the prospect of securing and preserving their rights in a legal
system with whose institutions and rules they are not familiar . . . The
consul, while fully complying with the law of the detaining state, is able to
assist these nationals in securing and preserving their rights, often by
helping them to obtain local counsel. The consul’s presence may also help
assuage the distress of detained nationals.19
Among the services U.S. consuls provide that relate directly to legal proceedings are:
(1) providing a list of attorneys who are familiar with the kinds of law
relevant to the detainee’s case; (2) removing names of “dishonest,
incompetent, or inattentive” attorneys from the list; (3) monitoring the
well-being of the detainee; (4) protesting discrimination against the

abroad. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006) (President has duty to demand and effectuate release of
Americans wrongfully imprisoned abroad).
16
CPPC, supra note 8, art. 6(2) (foreign national arrested for crime against internationally protected person
specifically accorded right to consular notification).
17
Sanchez-Llama v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2691 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18
Id. at 2692 (quoting 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 401 (1984)).
19
Telegram 40298 from U.S. Dept. of State to Embassy in Damascus (Feb. 21, 1975) in Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Memorandum of Nov. 29, 2001 re: Consular Notification & Access, 2-3,
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/011129Ichr.pdf [hereinafter “LCHR”].
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detainee; and (5) attending the trial, even in the absence of
discrimination.20
Along the same lines, denying a foreign national detained in this country the “cultural
bridge” provided by his or her consulate, “deprives the foreign national of equality of
legal process and the ability to mount a proper defense.”21 From a domestic view, the
problem has largely been seen as one of ineffective assistance of counsel.22 Yet, the right
to consular access implicates additional dimensions in the realm of criminal defense. In
at least one Texas criminal case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand of the case for
reconsideration of the sentence cast light on the importance and effectiveness of consular
assistance to the defendant.23 In that case, the Argentine Consul General specifically
worked toward the eventual replacement of the lead defense counsel.24
These concerns are pertinent not only to American tourists, but also:
United States citizens are scattered around the world as missionaries,
Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and students, as travelers for
business and for pleasure. Their freedom and safety are seriously
endangered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and other
nations follow their example.25
Presently, concerns about compliance with the VCCR in the United States arise
almost entirely from the actions of state officials. The federal government has enacted
regulations specifically requiring that notification of consular rights be given to foreign

20

Id. at 3.
M. Todd Parker, “Review and Reconsideration:” In Search of a Just Standard of Review for Violations
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 244
(2006) (quoting Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for
the Right to Consul, 18 Mich. J. Int'l L. 565, 601 (1997)). Consular access would allow the defendant,
whose family resides in another country, the ability to communicate with his family, to obtain mitigating
evidence for the penalty phase of trial, and obtain medical history if applicable. Id.
22
See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686 n.6; id. at 2690 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
23
Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
24
Margaret Mendenhall, Note & Comment, 8 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 335, 350 (2001-2002).
25
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring) (quoted in LCHR, supra
note 19, at 3).
21
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nationals who are arrested, whether by law enforcement or immigration officials.26 The
State Department has also published specific instructions on the notification of consular
rights for federal, state, and local law enforcement use.27 However, only California
appears to have given any serious thought to the issue of compliance by law enforcement
officials with the VCCR.28 In the meantime, judicial commentators have voiced alarm at
the number of consular rights violations often admitted by state officials.29
The problem of state compliance with federal treaties is not a new one. The
United States Constitution itself was born out of an era in which the federal government
was unable to effectively enter into treaties because of the various state governments’
non-compliance with existing treaty obligations.30 The most prominent cases during that
era involved state legislatures’ unwillingness to abide by the terms of the Treaty of Peace
of 1783 between the United States and Great Britain, wherein British creditors’ rights
against American debtors were to be safeguarded.31

With the national government

unable to operate on the international level, the framers of the Constitution fashioned the
treaty power so that treaties entered into by the United States would be the “supreme law
of the land,” and thus binding the states.32 From the earliest days of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has upheld the supremacy of federal treaties over conflicting state
26

E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2006) (DOJ law enforcement personnel required to give notice of consular rights
to arrested alien); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2006) (DHS officials required to give notice of consular rights to
detained alien); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(e) (2006) (consular rights notification required in proceedings before
Executive Office of Immigration Review).
27
See, e.g., Dept. of State Publication: Consular Notification & Access: Instructions for Federal, State, and
Local Law Enforcement & Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights
of Consular Officials to Assist Them (1998), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNA_book.pdf; LCHR,
supra note 19, at 5.
28
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c (2006) (requiring notification to alien arrestee of VCCR access rights).
29
See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 673 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Emuegbunam, 268
F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing cases involving state violations of the VCCR).
30
See Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21-29, Medellin v.
Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), for an excellent discussion of this issue.
31
See id.
32
See id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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statutes.33 Accordingly, there should be no question that the VCCR is binding upon state
officials.34

III.

FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF STATE VCCR VIOLATIONS

A.

Overview
As a matter of constitutional law, the federal courts are well positioned to correct

treaty violations that have not been adequately addressed by the state courts.

For

example, the Supreme Court has the authority to directly review the decisions of state
supreme courts on issues of federal law by way of the writ of certiorari.35 However,
where state officials have not notified an alien criminal defendant of his or her rights
under the VCCR, the factual basis of a VCCR violation claim will likely not have been
developed in state court.
Federal habeas corpus review of state officials’ violations of the VCCR has been
the central forum for American jurisprudence on the rights of alien defendants under the
VCCR. Accordingly, this article will focus on constraints placed on the federal habeas
review of state court criminal convictions. Currently, federal habeas review appears to be
hampered by two domestic procedural constraints: procedural default rules and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).37 Both constraints
have featured prominently in the Court’s VCCR jurisprudence.

33

See id. (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 235, 236-37 (1796)).
The parties in Sanchez-Llamas conceded that the VCCR was “self-executing” so that no act of Congress
was necessary for it to have domestic effect and be enforceable in American courts. 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2694
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the self-executing nature of a treaty does not solve the problem
of whether a criminal defendant has standing to complain of a VCCR violation.
35
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
37
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
34
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Under the AEDPA, federal habeas review is no longer permitted unless the
petitioner can demonstrate that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision contrary
to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.”38 Where the federal district court denies the habeas petition, federal appellate
courts do not have jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the petition until the issuance of
a certificate of appealability (“COA”),39 which it may not issue unless the petitioner
demonstrates a violation of a constitutional right.40
The problem for alien criminal defendants, who have not been informed of their
rights under the VCCR, is that normally neither they, nor their attorneys, are aware that
such a violation has occurred.41 As a result, the defendant will not have raised the VCCR
violation during state trial or appellate proceedings.42

So, direct review of a state

supreme court’s decision by the Supreme Court of any VCCR claim would be futile,
because such a claim will not appear in the reviewable appellate record. Often, the
defendant invokes the VCCR only as part of the habeas proceedings in federal court, at
which time the procedural default rule applies to bar argument on the issue.43 The
procedural default rule bars federal habeas review of issues that were not raised in state
courts.44 One of the major questions in cases of VCCR violations is whether the United

38

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). Otherwise, the petitioner faces the considerable hurdle of showing that
state court criminal proceedings “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006).
39
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1034
(2003).
40
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006) (COA requires “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right”). See e.g., Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327.
41
See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 476-77 (June 27).
42
See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2676-77 (2006); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 625 (4th Cir.
1998); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998).
43
See, e.g., LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1261.
44
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1355 (1998) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977)).
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States’ obligation to give “full effect” to Article 36 consular rights45 trumps the
considerable restrictions on federal habeas review imposed by AEDPA. Unfortunately,
before a defendant can even address that argument, in most cases, the procedural default
rules have already foreclosed discussion of the VCCR in federal court. 46
B.

The Procedural Default Rule
Concerning Article 36 of the VCCR, there is potential conflict between the

treaty’s statement that the rights contained therein “shall be exercised in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the receiving State” and the clear condition that “said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given” to rights under the VCCR.47 The
Supreme Court first addressed this potential conflict in Breard v. Greene, where a
Paraguayan national failed to raise VCCR violations until his federal habeas petition.48
The Court in Breard appears to have downplayed the conditional clause and relied
primarily upon the provision stating VCCR rights were to be exercised in conformity
with the procedural law of the forum. The Court found that the procedural default rule
barred discussion of VCCR violations during federal habeas proceedings by relying upon
its earlier jurisprudence on treaty interpretation which found that “absent a clear and
express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.”49 Nevertheless, the Court conceded that “we
should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty
rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such,”50 and observed that

45

See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b)(2).
See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
47
See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2).
48
523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
49
Id. at 375.
50
Id.
46
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“[i]t is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are pending before
the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier.”51
In the end, the ICJ did not address the international legal implications of the
Breard case, because the United States and Paraguay settled their differences and
stipulated to the dismissal of the ICJ proceedings.52 However, domestic courts were left
to rely on Breard for guidance concerning VCCR violations in criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court itself relied on Breard in dismissing Germany’s 1999 domestic
lawsuit against the United States and the State of Arizona.53 However, that case turned
on a separate holding of Breard that had reiterated the sovereign immunity of the United
States and the Eleventh Amendment bar of suits against a state in federal court.54
Germany’s domestic lawsuit involved consular rights violations against two German
nationals in Arizona, which the defense had not raised in state court before seeking
federal habeas review.55 Nevertheless, Germany’s international suit against the United
States in the ICJ resulted in a judgment that the procedural default rule violated the
United States’ VCCR obligations, where no meaningful review was given.56 Before the
51

Id. at 378.
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Order of
Nov. 10).
53
F.R.G. v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111, 112, 119 S. Ct. 1016, 1017 (1999).
54
Id. The Eleventh Amendment has been an impediment in several domestic VCCR enforcement actions
by foreign states in federal courts. See, e.g., Rep. of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998);
Mex. v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997). There do not appear to be any similar suits by foreign
governments in state courts. However, the prospect remains open provided that the hurdle of a forum
state’s sovereign immunity can be overcome. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1350 (district courts have original
jurisdiction over international tort claims by aliens), and 1351 (district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over cases where foreign consul or diplomat is defendant), with Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 24 N.E.2d
81, 83 (N.Y. 1939) (foreign governments may request vindication of rights in state court).
55
See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, LaGrand v. Arizona, 526 U.S.
1001, 119 S. Ct. 1137 (1999). The underlying state court proceedings involved questions of purely
domestic law. See State v. LaGrand (Walter), 153 Ariz. 21, 734 P.2d 563 (1987); State v. LaGrand (Karl),
152 Ariz. 483, 733 P.2d 1066 (1987), cert. denied, LaGrand v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 206
(1987).
56
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98, 515-16 (June 27).
52
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Supreme Court could revisit the issue, Mexico obtained another ICJ judgment against the
United States directing that the VCCR required review for possible prejudice, regardless
of domestic procedural default rules.57
The issue of VCCR violations took center stage again in the case of one of the
Mexican nationals on whose behalf Mexico had sued the United States in the ICJ.58 In
Medellin v. Dretke, the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a defendant whose VCCR
violation claims had already been barred by the procedural default rule in state habeas
proceedings, prior to the denial of his petition for federal habeas relief.59 The petitioner
argued that since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Breard, the ICJ had not only
determined that procedural default should not be a complete bar to post-conviction
review of VCCR rights violations, but also had specifically held that post-conviction
review should be considered for this particular petitioner (and others on whose behalf
Mexico had sued).60 International law apparently moved more quickly than domestic
jurisprudence, as prophesied in Lord Denning’s famous admonition that, in matters of
international law, lower courts need not always wait for the higher courts to change the
rule.61 However, the Fifth Circuit decided that the Breard opinion prevented it from
granting the COA necessary for Medellin’s federal habeas petition to go forward.62

57

Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 65, ¶ 138 (Mar.
31).
58
Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529, 554 (Eng. C.A.). In Lord
Denning’s famous words: “International law knows no rule of stare decisis. If this court today is satisfied
that the rule of international law on a subject has changed from what it was 50 or 60 years ago, it can give
effect to that change-and apply the change in our English law-without waiting for the House of Lords to do
it.” Id. One of his colleagues on the English Court of Appeal came to Lord Denning’s aid, observing that
for international commercial actors who rely on predictable judicial outcomes: “Lastly, there must be a
greater risk of confusion if precepts discarded outside England by a majority (or perhaps all) of civilized
states are preserved as effective in English courts in a sort of judicial aspic.” Id. at 579 (per Shaw, L.J.).
Those familiar with Lord Denning’s distinguished career may also recall his “one-man crusade” to alter the
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The Supreme Court accepted review of Medellin’s case, where the issues to be
decided revolved around the domestic effect of the ICJ’s interpretations of the VCCR as a
matter of comity, stare decisis, and res judicata.63

In the end, the Supreme Court

managed to avoid these politically sensitive questions when President George W. Bush
issued a memorandum directing state courts to give effect to the ICJ’s judgment in favor
of Mexico.64 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals followed the presidential directive
and granted a last minute habeas review. The Supreme Court deferred to this decision,
finding that “state proceeding may provide Medellin with the review and reconsideration
of his Vienna Convention claim that the ICJ required, and that Medellin now seeks in this
proceeding.”65 With the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the writ of certiorari in his case,
the state court will decide Medellin’s Vienna Convention claims.66
Finally, in Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court took the VCCR head on. The
Court rejected the ICJ’s requirement to disregard procedural default rules where
necessary, and instead based its decision upon the text of the treaty itself and the
supposed intentions of the treaty parties. The Court held fast to its earlier opinion in
Breard and came to the conclusion that (1) it was not bound by the decisions of the ICJ,67

doctrine of stare decisis in domestic jurisprudence as well. See Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 264, 325
(U.K.H.L.) (per Lord Diplock).
62
Medellin, 371 F.3d at 274. The panel also determined that it was bound by an earlier en banc opinion by
the same circuit in the case of U.S. v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2004), finding that the
VCCR did not provide any rights to individuals in U.S. courts. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280.
63
See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005).
64
Id. at 663.
65
Id. at 664. The state court proceedings are still pending. See Ex parte Medellin, 2005 WL 1532996
(Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005).
66
See id. at 667.
67
The majority in Sanchez-Llamas devoted a great deal of space to justifying its refusal to apply pertinent
ICJ precedent. There is no question that neither the U.S. Constitution, the Statute of the I.C.J., 59 Stat.
1062, T.S. No. 993 (1945), nor the U.N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 933 (1945), requires U.S. courts to
follow ICJ decisions. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684-85 (2006). However,
Sanchez-Llamas represents the first case in which the high court has declined to do so. See id. at 2701–02
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The opinion signals the United States’ withdrawal from the ICJ’s compulsory
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and (2) “[t]he ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 is inconsistent with the basic framework
of an adversary system” like that of the United States.68 The majority in Sanchez-Llamas
determined that “[i]n our system . . . the responsibility for failing to raise an issue
generally rests with the parties themselves,” whereas in an “inquisitorial” system, used by
the majority of parties to the VCCR, the judge investigates the facts and law
independently of the parties.69
One reading of Sanchez-Llamas is that the VCCR’s provision on the exercise of
treaty rights according to local procedural rules permits common law jurisdictions to
ignore the ICJ’s censure of procedural default rules. The Court justifies this interpretation
by arguing that default rules are integral to the adversarial system.70 Moreover, the
majority in Sanchez-Llamas also noted that in inquisitorial systems “the failure to raise a
legal error can in part be attributable to the magistrate, and thus to the state itself,” unlike
in an adversarial system.71 The Court ultimately found that the United States is not in
violation of the VCCR when its courts employ blanket procedural default rules, and thus
it would no not be necessary to revisit the messy issue of trumping state and federal
procedural default doctrines with a federal treaty.
jurisdiction for VCCR disputes. Moreover, the majority’s argument that the United States’ withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21
U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 14 (Cmnd. 5219), somehow
negates the effect of the ICJ’s opinions prior to the U.S. withdrawal is inconsistent with the court’s own
wholesale adoption of precedent from appellate court decisions of the now defunct Articles of Confederacy.
Compare Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685, with Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 85-86 (1795)
(affirming jurisdiction of defunct U.S. Ct. App. in Cases of Capture). Ironically, the U.S. played a key role
in drafting the Optional Protocol and was the first country to invoke its compulsory jurisdictional clause in
her 1979 dispute with Iran. Camille Cancio, The United States’ International Obligations and the Impact
on Federalism: Medellin v. Dretke and the Force of Avena in American Courts, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 1047,
1052 (2006).
68
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. However, this appears to contradict cases where the Supreme Court considered court enforcement of
unconstitutional private covenants a “state action.” E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 68 S. Ct.
836, 842 (1948).
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C.

Domestic Conflicts between the AEDPA and the VCCR
The Supreme Court ruling in Sanchez-Llamas had two other important results: the

vindication of procedural default rules in Breard remains in place, and a criminal
defendant must raise any VCCR claims in state court proceedings before seeking federal
habeas review. However, the question remains as to whether federal habeas relief can be
extended to defendants convicted in state courts, even where the claim was properly
developed in state court proceedings. The Supreme Court has not specifically revisited
the conflict between the AEDPA and the VCCR since its decision in Breard.
Nevertheless, the Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas lends no support whatsoever to
criminal defendants’ attempts to base federal habeas review of their state convictions on
VCCR claims. The majority in Sanchez-Llamas specifically observed that “[a] foreign
national detained on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our
system the protections of the Due Process Clause . . . Article 36 adds little to these ‘legal
options.’”72

Such clear judicial indifference from the nation’s highest court to the

importance of the VCCR rights of foreign nationals will likely have a chilling effect on
petitions for federal habeas review based on violations of VCCR rights.
Under the AEDPA, a successful habeas petition against a state court conviction
requires the violation of a right under federal law. However, the Supreme Court in
Sanchez-Llamas declined to decide whether the VCCR grants rights to individuals (as
opposed to state parties to the treaty).73 The Court also refused to grant any appreciable
remedy for VCCR violations.74 After Sanchez-Llamas, federal district judges cannot be
faulted for denying habeas review of state convictions where VCCR rights violations
72

Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2681-82.
Id. at 2677-78.
74
Id. at 2682, 2687.
73
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form the basis of the defendant’s petition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not yet
even determined whether individuals have VCCR rights under federal law.
Federal appellate courts, moreover, are not likely to issue many COA’s in VCCR
violation cases. In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court seems to have answered the
question it posed in Medellin as to whether a person convicted in spite of a violation of
VCCR rights could clear the considerable hurdle of demonstrating that the deprivation of
a treaty right is legally comparable to the deprivation of a constitutional right.75 By
deciding that a mandatory exculpatory rule in VCCR rights violation cases is not
appropriate, the Court in Sanchez-Llamas effectively ruled out the possibility that anyone
in such cases can show the violation of a constitutional right.76 The basis of the Court’s
refusal to impose such a rule arose out of its conclusion that VCCR notification does not
implicate any constitutional concerns and does little to strengthen any applicable
constitutional safeguards.77 A COA is contingent on the deprivation of a constitutional
right, and the Sanchez-Llamas opinion appears to be the clearest indication that the
deprivation of the VCCR notification right does not rise to that level.
The AEDPA also thwarts the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR on a more direct
level. The AEDPA requires that a defendant exhaust all state court remedies prior to
seeking review in federal court.78 The AEDPA also declares that a petitioner seeking
federal habeas review of a state conviction based on a treaty violation cannot obtain an
evidentiary hearing where the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of the treaty

75

See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005).
See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
77
Id. at 2681-82.
78
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) (2006).
76
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violation in state court.79 This specific rule for treaty violations essentially renders the
federal courts unable to carry out the ICJ’s rulings in La Grand and Avena. The Court in
Breard v. Greene accepted it as a given that the AEDPA superseded the United States’
obligations under the VCCR.80 In coming to this conclusion, the Court employed the lex
posterior rule adopted in Whitney v. Robertson,81 which mechanically establishes that
where a federal statute conflicts with a treaty, “the one last in date will control the
other.”82

The ultimate result of the AEDPA is that state courts have been further

insulated from federal review, even where state court criminal decisions implicate federal
treaties.

D.

Alternative Interpretations of the AEDPA’s Effects on U.S. VCCR Obligations
The Supreme Court’s mechanical use of the lex posterior rule in Breard was not

its only option. After all, an older rule of statutory interpretation urges courts to interpret
statutes in line with pre-existing treaty obligations unless there is an express legislative
declaration to the contrary.83 This “Charming Betsy doctrine” has persisted for well over
two hundred years.84 It is a doctrine of judicial interpretation not limited to American

79

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (2006). However, the terms of these statutory provisions speak in general
terms regarding habeas proceedings and do not single out claimed treaty violations for treatment that differs
from other federal legal claims.
80
See 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
81
124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 458 (1888). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18, 77 S. Ct. 1222,
1231 (1957).
82
Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (quoting Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194). The same standard is generally employed in
international law for conflicting legal norms. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 30(3),
May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 7964) (parties to same
treaty will give effect to later adopted obligations).
83
See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“…an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains ….”).
84
See Michael Franck, Note, The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, Medellin v. Dretke,
and the Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B.U. L. REV. 515, 519 (2006).
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courts.85 The wisdom of this approach is evident when one considers that a court’s
failure to read a new statute over a pre-existing treaty can be remedied by more specific
domestic legislation, while the same court’s over-eagerness to read down treaty
obligations and give preeminence to newly passed statutes would result in the nation’s
withdrawal (intentional or not) from a treaty in spite of its earlier negotiation, adoption,
signature, and ratification processes. The Charming Betsy doctrine acknowledges that
the legislature has the means to correct the courts’ decisions, while, if left to their own
devices, the courts have the power to wreak havoc on the Executive’s ability to conduct
foreign policy.
While the Charming Betsy doctrine and its call for judicial restraint may seem
sensible enough, American courts have no uniform rule of treaty interpretation with
respect to statutory derogation of treaty obligations. The strict lex posterior rule adopted
in Breard for VCCR cases appears to be one of three co-existing standards for resolving
conflicts between treaties and federal statutes.86 As stated above, the oldest standard
originates with Charming Betsy. After the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Charming Betsy, lower federal courts divided along lines that one commentator has
termed the “internationalist” and “moderate” standards under the wider doctrine.87 Under
the “internationalist” interpretation of the doctrine, in order for a court to disregard a
treaty obligation in favor of a federal statute, the statute must contain “the clearest of
expressions on the part of Congress.”88

In United States v. Palestinian Liberation

85

E.g., Garland v. Brit. Rail Eng’g Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 751, 771 (U.K.H.L.) (British courts ought to
construe later statutes in conformity with pre-existing treaties wherever possible). Some other nations’
constitutions have solidified this rule of construction by specifically subordinating domestic legislation to
treaty law. E.g., 1958 CONST. 55 (Fr.); CONST. ARG. 75(22).
86
See Franck, supra note 84, generally.
87
Id. at 522, 529.
88
Id. at 523-24 (quoting U.S. v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
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Organization,89 the district court refused to override the U.N. Headquarters Agreement90
in favor of a statute which prohibited the establishment of a PLO office in the United
States, “notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.”91 The district court
essentially required the statute to explicitly state that it was superseding the Headquarters
Agreement before it would disregard the treaty.92
However, under the “moderate” approach to the Charming Betsy doctrine, some
courts do not require Congress to expressly name the treaty being superseded, but will
disregard a treaty where Congress has expressed its intent to “override the protection that
a treaty would otherwise provide.”93

Thus, the disagreement between the two

interpretations of the Charming Betsy doctrine stems from differences on how “express”
a congressional desire to supersede a treaty must be.94

Under the internationalist

standard, Congress has to name the treaty to be superseded, while under the moderate
standard, Congress need only expressly override a right or protection otherwise offered
by a treaty. While the moderate standard usually favors the domestic statute, the ultimate
decision in such cases can only be made after identifying Congress’s clear intent to
abrogate the treaty.95 In contrast, under the third model of treaty-statute conflict analysis,
exemplified in Breard, no analysis of congressional intent is necessary, since the later
law automatically controls.96

89

695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 3416 (1947).
91
22 U.S.C. § 5202(3) (2006).
92
P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1471.
93
Franck, supra note 84, at 529 (citing Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 203 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir.
2000)).
94
See id.
95
Id. at 531.
96
See id.
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In the cases of the conflict between the AEDPA and the VCCR, the only
interpretive standard that could save the VCCR is the internationalist approach to the
Charming Betsy doctrine. It is clear from the AEDPA that state remedies must be
exhausted before allowing a resort to federal habeas review, and federal courts will not
rule on treaty rights violations during habeas proceedings without a factual record
established in state court. Accordingly, the VCCR’s requirement that “full effect” be
given to the rights established under Article 36 conflicts with the prohibitions on federal
review contained in the AEDPA. The coexistence of the lex posterior rule announced in
Whitney v. Robertson and the Charming Betsy doctrine in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence represents a puzzling lacuna in the law on conflicts of federal law. The fact
that both standards come from the Supreme Court and neither has been overruled
undermines the precedential effect of Breard’s view of the VCCR. Sanchez-Llamas did
not resolve this conflict between the Whitney and Charming Betsy standards.
Nevertheless, under Breard, the AEDPA trumps the VCCR.
Sanchez-Llamas avoided the issue of the conflict between AEDPA and the VCCR
by relying on the language in Article 36(2) and on case law concerning treaty
interpretation. As a result, the Court determined that the rules for implementing Article
36 rights were to be left to the domestic law of the state parties to the VCCR. Under that
analysis, the United States can never be in violation of the VCCR by merely employing
neutral procedural rules. Since the AEDPA imposes only neutral procedural rules, it does
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not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VCCR or the plain text of
Article 36(2). However, the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR taking precedence over
procedural default rules remains. If the AEDPA imposes such rules, then it represents a
departure from the United States’ treaty obligations under the VCCR according to the
ICJ. Since the ICJ is perhaps the most widely respected authority on public international
law,98 the effect of the Supreme Court’s refusal to apply ICJ precedent is significant. In
the meantime, the Court appears to have given its imprimatur to Congress’ grant of
authority to the states to ignore treaty violations with impunity. Under the AEDPA and
Sanchez-Llamas, treaty violations in state courts, particularly of the VCCR, will probably
not even be subject to review in federal habeas proceedings.99
IV.

PRECLUSION AS REMEDY FOR TREATY VIOLATION
The Court in Sanchez-Llamas also considered whether the remedy of mandatory

exclusion was proper in cases where state law enforcement officials had violated the
VCCR by failing to inform an arrested alien of his or her rights under the treaty.100 The
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See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2700-01 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 103 cmt. b (1987)); See Susan W.
Tiefenbrun, The Role of the World Court in Settling International Disputes: A Recent Assessment, 20 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1997); Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A
Preliminary Inquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 134 (L. Damrosch ed.
1987).
99
There remains, of course, the separate route of domestic civil redress for VCCR violations, which is
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, at least one court has specifically determined that a state
party to the VCCR has standing in U.S. courts to sue for violations of the VCCR against its nationals. Rep.
of Para. v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998).
However, the Eleventh Amendment remains a hurdle to such suits in federal court where the defendant
state has not waived its immunity from suit. Id. Additionally, at least one federal circuit court has
determined the alien defendant in criminal proceedings may bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act
for state criminal proceedings that run afoul of the VCCR. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005).
However, American legal commentators have already begun to show vehemence against such domestic
vindication of international legal rights. E.g., Anthony Jones, Comment, Jogi v. Voges: Has the Seventh
Circuit Opened the Floodgates to Vienna Convention Litigation in U.S. Courts?, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 425
(2006). Such statements of domestic disinterest for the plight of foreigners in the American criminal justice
system do little to solve the larger problem of safeguarding the rights of Americans abroad by domestic
compliance with the VCCR.
100
126 S. Ct. 2669, 2677 (2006).
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Court determined that mandatory suppression was not necessary.101

However, the

petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas seeking suppression had conceded to the question of
whether mandatory exclusion was to be decided by domestic law rather than international
law.102 The petitioner was limited to this purely domestic legal argument, since the ICJ
had already specifically rejected the international imposition of a mandatory exclusionary
rule.103 Unfortunately for the petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court declined
to fashion a remedy “for the enforcement of federal law in state-court criminal
proceedings.”104
The Court began its rejection of mandatory exclusion by observing that “our
authority to create a judicial remedy applicable in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the
treaty itself.”105 The Court determined that Article 36(2) deferred to American domestic
law for the implementation of Article 36 rights.106 The Court also determined that
mandatory exclusionary rules had only been developed to address Fourth and Fifth
Amendment issues,107 whereas the right to consular notification “is at best remotely
connected to the gathering of evidence. Article 36 has nothing whatsoever to do with
searches or interrogations.”108 Furthermore, while the unreliability of confessions under
duress is a valid consideration for imposition of a mandatory exclusionary rule, “[t]he
failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 rights is unlikely, with any frequency, to
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Id. at 2682.
Id. at 2678-79.
103
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 61 (Mar. 31).
104
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2679.
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Id.
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Id. at 2680.
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Id. at 2680-81.
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Id. at 2681. The ICJ also rejected the notion that VCCR notification must occur before any
interrogation. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 49.
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produce unreliable confessions.”109 Additionally, the Court deferred to the government’s
observation that “[w]e are unaware of any country party to the [Vienna Convention] that
provides remedies for violations of consular notification through its domestic criminal
justice system.”110
Sanchez-Llamas, however, leaves open the question of whether state courts are
free to adopt mandatory or discretionary exclusionary rules of their own in cases of
VCCR notification rights violations.111 Since the Court has clearly stated that Article 36
“adds little” to the domestic legal rights of a criminal defendant in American courts,112 it
is unlikely that state supreme courts will jump at the chance to impose mandatory
exclusionary rules against state law enforcement officials that violate Article 36.
Nevertheless, there is some reason to think that a discretionary exclusionary rule for
Article 36 violations would be appropriate in both state and federal courts.
To begin with, the domestic courts of other common law countries reserve the
right to exclude evidence where there has been an egregious violation of Article 36.
Cases from Canada and Australia show that trial judges in those countries have
considered Article 36 violations when deciding whether to exclude evidence in criminal
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Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2681.
Id. at 2680. Reviewing the practices of the United States’ treaty partners in their implementation of the
same treaty is an accepted means of determining the United States’ own compliance with that treaty. Id. at
2689 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76
(1999)). When undertaking such comparative analyses, the court probably needs to underscore the
reasoning for the examination of foreign sources in light of the various domestic voices raised in staunch
opposition to any use of foreign law. See, e.g., Const. Restoration Act, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. §§ 201,
302 (2005) (banning the use of non-Anglo-American sources for judicial interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution and calling for the impeachment of judges who violate the ban).
111
As to the question of review of the failure of state police to give notice to a defendant of his or her rights
under the VCCR, this question appears to have been “collapsed” into the domestic ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See Force of Judgments by the Int’l Court of Justice – Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 119 HARV. L. REV. 327, 336 (2005).
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Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
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proceedings.113 Moreover, both Ireland and the United Kingdom have domestic statutory
and regulatory frameworks that enable the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
the VCCR.114
Giving trial judges the discretion to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
VCCR would insulate these decisions from appellate reversal, thus making the Article 36
right to notification more real. Yet, it would also allow American courts to deliver an
“effective remedy” for VCCR violations, which is all that some sources interpret the
ICJ’s decisions against the United States to require.115 So far most state courts have not
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See Tan Seng Kiah v. Queen (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26 (Austl.); Regina v. Tan [2001] W.A.S.C. 275 (Austl.)
(Sup. Ct. W. Austl.); Regina v. Partak, [2001] 160 C.C.C.3d 553, ¶ 63 (Can.); Queen v. Van Bergen, [2000]
261 A.R. 387, 390 (Can.) (Ct. App. Alberta). The case of Regina v. Su, [1997] 1 V.R. 1, 55 (Austl.) (Sup.
Ct. Vic.) does not address the VCCR per se, but did consider the foreign defendant’s unfamiliarity with the
domestic legal system in determining whether inculpatory evidence should have been excluded for
threatening the “fairness” of the criminal proceedings. See Brief of Crim. Justice Legal Foundation as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-15, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566).
Certain amici in Sanchez-Llamas also cited Regina v. Bassil and Mouffaregi (Acton Crown Ct. 1990) and
Regina v. Van Axel and Wezer (Snaresbrook Crown Ct. 1991), handed down by the same English trial
judge. Id. at 18. In these cases, the judge suppressed evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 because
of the importance of Britain’s treaty obligations and of the right to notification itself. See Legal Action 23
(Dec. 1990).
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See Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Síochána Stations);
Regulations 1987, Regulation 14 (Irish police required to give advisory on VCCR); Code of Practice C,
available at http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operationalpolicing/PACE_Chapter_C.pdf?view=Binary (July 2006 revisions per Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.);
Reg. 7.1 requires that arrestee “must be informed as soon as practicable” of VCCR rights authorized by
Police & Crim. Evid. Act 1984 (Code of Practice C & Code of Practice H) Order 2006, S.I. 2006/1938
(U.K.)). English courts are specifically empowered to take into account the fairness of allowing evidence
that was obtained in breach of a statute or regulations when deciding whether to exclude the evidence.
Police & Crim. Evid. Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78 (U.K.). Even though Article 36 was not among the VCCR
provisions stated to have the force of law within the U.K. See Consular Relations Act, 1968, c. 18, § 1 and
Sch. 1 (U.K.). Nevertheless, earlier sources have claimed that British courts had the power at common law
to suppress evidence where the manner of its procurement brought the fairness of proceedings into doubt.
R. v. Sang, [1980] 2 A.C. 402, 435 (U.K.H.L.) (per Lord Diplock). The new statutory power of
suppression applies even if the illegally obtained evidence is reliable. However, some British jurists have
claimed a similar discretion at common law “to exclude evidence if it is necessary in order to secure a fair
trial for the accused.” Scott v. R., [1989] A.C. 1242, 1256 (U.K.P.C.). The Sanchez-Llamas majority’s
bold assertion that American courts invented the remedy of suppression and continue to be the only courts
that dispense it is refuted by the strength and antiquity of the authorities to the contrary. 126 S. Ct. at 2706
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 262, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.
1783)).
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Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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discussed the notion,116 preferring, like the Supreme Court, to address the issue as a
choice between no exclusion or mandatory exclusion.117 In such cases, American courts
should evaluate the need for suppression in terms of “prejudice” to the defendant.118 This
would arguably be equivalent to the “fairness” inquiry conducted by trial judges in other
common law jurisdictions.119
The majority in Sanchez-Llamas dismissed the idea of putting aside the
procedural default rule in cases of VCCR violations, in part because it felt that doing
away with such default rules was anathema to the adversarial common law system.
However, common law systems rely on evidentiary suppression more than inquisitorial
civil law systems. In an inquisitorial proceeding, the judge is able to “put aside” or
“forget about” evidence obtained in violation of the law more readily than a jury.120
Accordingly there is less reason to keep such evidence away from the fact-finder, because
in inquisitorial proceedings the judge is able to weigh the importance of infractions by the
police by imposing, for example, a more lenient sentence.121 In other words, rules of
evidentiary suppression actually have more utility in American courts than in the courts
of most of America’s treaty partners.

V.

OVERSEAS EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC VCCR JURISPRUDENCE

116

One exception is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Torres v. State, where it declined to
require an alien criminal defendant to show “consular assistance would, or could, have made a difference in
the outcome of the criminal trial.” 120 P.3d 1184, 1186-87 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
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Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[t]he majority answers in absolute terms,
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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sanchez-Llamas is good domestic constitutional
law. However, the ramifications of American domestic practices overseas remains an
open question, since the VCCR is an international treaty representing the obligations of
the United States to other nations. The majority in Sanchez-Llamas paid lip service to
this fact when it concluded that “[o]ur holding in no way disparages the importance of the
Vienna Convention.”122 Apparently, the majority felt that “[a]lthough these cases involve
the delicate question of the application of an international treaty, the issues in many ways
turn on established principles of domestic law.”123 Chief Justice Rehnquist perhaps did a
better job of highlighting the “delicate” nature of the problem in U.S. v. AlvarezMachain, where the Court held that American courts had jurisdiction to try a Mexican
national who had been abducted while in Mexico by federal agents and forcibly taken to
the U.S. for trial.124 He noted that such an abduction “may be in violation of general
international law principles” as a clear invasion of Mexico’s sovereignty.125
The basic problem in consular rights cases is that the realms of domestic and
international law are mutually exclusive in the American constitutional order.126 As an
example, “[s]tatutes inconsistent with principles of customary international law may well
lead to international law violations. But within the domestic legal realm, that inconsistent
statute simply modifies or supersedes customary international law to the extent of the
inconsistency.”127 The result is that in domestic courts, “no enactment of Congress can
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be challenged on the ground that it violates customary international law.”128 The lex
posterior rule places international treaties on par with international custom; for domestic
purposes, both can be superseded by a later-enacted federal statute. However, because
the realms of international and domestic law are also mutually exclusive, there remains a
distinct legal effect between the United States and its treaty partners that is separate from
issues of domestic constitutionality.
At this point in time, there is no certainty as to whether the rule in SanchezLlamas puts the United States in breach of its obligations under the VCCR. Considering
such, the laws and practices of other countries are important in the interpretation of the
VCCR.129 The VCCR itself is obviously an important treaty, as the rights of a traveler in
a foreign country often do, and should, have a certain resonance with the American
public. This is evident with the general public’s understanding of the reciprocal nature of
public international law.

For example, American newspapers responded to the ICJ

decisions against the United States with predictions that if the United States did not honor
its commitments under the VCCR, other countries may decide not to extend consular
rights notification to American citizens abroad.130 Other countries do have the option of
suspending their obligations to the United States under the VCCR, if they consider the
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Id. at 939.
A newly developed custom will not usually supersede a treaty obligation in the same way that a treaty
will supersede pre-existing custom, but developments in national practices that lead to changes in
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U.S. to be in breach of its own obligations under that treaty.131

This doctrine of

“retorsion,” or countermeasures, has always been available to nations where one of their
treaty partners has refused to uphold its legal obligations.132 Presently, with two ICJ
decisions against the United States, the prospect of being found in violation of the VCCR
is real, even if it is slight.133 Accordingly, a great deal of attention should be paid to
jurisprudential developments abroad.134
While Sanchez-Llamas refused to determine whether the VCCR actually vested
rights in individuals135 (in spite of two clear ICJ holdings that Article 36 did vest
individuals with enforceable rights),136 the lower federal courts are divided on the
question.137 However, outside of the United States, courts are generally moving in a
131
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direction that attempts to vindicate individual human rights in spite of the State-centric
nature of international law. For example, in Pinochet, the House of Lords held that
human rights considerations should be taken into account in cases of extradition despite
the fact that extradition treaties generally exist to preserve only the rights of the states
involved.138 The debate between American jurists on whether Article 36 even creates
individual rights merely confirms that, along with most issues arising out of international
law, “unfortunately, too many courts continue to labor in the international field using
only the tools of domestic doctrine.”139
Another recent House of Lords decision imposed upon British courts a mandatory
exclusionary rule applicable to all evidence obtained under torture, even if the torture was
administered by officials of other governments.140

In that decision, the Law Lords

determined that the United Kingdom’s commitment to various treaty obligations to
eliminate torture warranted a mandatory exclusionary rule against evidence obtained by
torture, even if the U.K. government was not itself to blame.141 That decision has
garnered considerable attention abroad.142

Yet, the Supreme Court’s refusal to

implement a mandatory exclusionary rule for violations that do not implicate Fourth or
Fifth Amendment rights shows how little such international currents have affected
American shores.143

While American judicial decisions now may seem merely
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unfashionable, the question remains as to whether the United States will be left behind if
other nations’ courts rise to the ICJ’s challenge and vindicate the rights of the foreigner in
strange criminal courts by seeking to give “full effect” to Article 36 rights. If such a
practice becomes prevalent, the practices in the United States with respect to the VCCR
will cease to be simply unfashionable, and may become a grave matter of noncompliance.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the most part, this article has assumed that ICJ jurisprudence forms part of the
VCCR itself. Continuing with this assumption, it appears that the Supreme Court has
allowed procedural default rules that protect the efficacy of state court convictions to
override ICJ interpretations of the United States’ VCCR obligations. Specifically, the
Roberts’ Court has determined that the VCCR does not supersede procedural default
rules. As a result, criminal defendants in state court must litigate any VCCR rights they
may have (regardless of whether they or their defense attorneys are ever aware that such
rights exist). In declining to prescribe any remedy where federal courts are in a position
to review VCCR violations, the Court has signaled its obvious indifference to the
domestic effects of the treaty.
Moreover, the Court’s latest opinion on the subject appears to solidify the belief
that the AEDPA prevents the post-conviction review required by ICJ decisions. The
Court clearly demonstrated that Article 36 violations cannot be on par with the sorts of
2472, 2495 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 123 S. Ct. 470 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari))).
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constitutional violations necessary to guarantee federal collateral review of a state court
conviction. By upholding its earlier opinion in Breard, the Court has interpreted the
AEDPA’s protection of state court proceedings to override rights created by a federal
treaty of fundamental significance for U.S. foreign relations, in spite of its own
jurisprudence on treaty interpretation that allows it to harmonize the AEDPA and the
VCCR. In the end, the Supreme Court appears, despite its constitutional powers to
safeguard the Republic’s duty to honor its treaty obligations, to have changed the issue of
VCCR compliance into a question of states’ rights. The several states appear to have
prevailed in this domestic legal discourse, possibly at the cost of both the federal
government’s credibility and the well-being of Americans abroad.
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